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In the Suprente Court of the
State of Utah

HYRUM JENKINS and BELLE MO·YLE
JENKINS, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

CASE
NO. 7826

JOHN B MORGAN, WILLIS MO·RGAN,
ALBERT MORGAN, BERT MORGAN,
ETHEL G. MORGAN, M. L. BUXTON,
'and MILO BURSTON,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE
The statement .of the so-called facts contained in appellants' brief is so limited in its scope that in our view much
of the evidence of controlling importance is omitted therefrom. We are unable to agree with appellants' statement
made on pages 3 and 4 of appellants' brief, to the effect that
the issue involved is whether or not the measure of damage of the value for the use for the withholding of the prop-
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erty by the defendants from the plaintiffs is to be based
upon the value of use as grazing ground-or the value of
the use as agricultural ground.
In our view the fundamental question before this Court
is: Does the evidence adduced at the trial require as a
matter of law a larger judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
than that awarded by the trial court? In order to determine that question it is, in our view, necessary to consider
a substantial part of the evidence offered and received at
the trial which is not mentioned in appellants' brief. We shall
briefly direct the attention of the Court to such additional
evidence.
, The land involved in this controversy is located near
Goshen, in the southwesterly part of Utah ~County. On
September 1947 when a supersedeas bond was executed for
the purpose of permitting the defendants in this action to
retain possession of the lands for which damage is claimed
for the withholding thereof, such lands were, and for many
.years prior thereto had been, covered with sagebrush and
native grasses and weeds (Tr. 77). (Note: We are using
the page numbers at the bottom of the Transcript.) It had
not been used for .raising agricultural crops· for at least 30
years prior to time of the trial of this cause (Tr. 65; 95).
On May, 17, 1947, plaintiff, Hyrum Jenkins, and one David
S. Powelson entered into a contract, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B,
whereby it was agreed that Powelson desired to purchase
the land involved in this litigation if Jenkins was successful
in the litigation to acquire the same. That Jenkins should
apply to appropriate water to irrigate the land, that Powelson should, at his own expense, break and level the land·
and drill for water. That if Powelson secured two second
feet of water, he should pay for the land the sufu of $500.00,
.
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but if t\vo second feet of water was not obtained and the
land was leased for the 1948 crop, Jenkins and Powelson
should each receive one-half of the gross rental of the property, and if Powelson operated the property for 1948 then
.Jenkins should receive one-half of the net profits, excluding the cost of the machinery that might be purchased by
Powelson. The agreement further provides that if possession and title was not acquired by September 1, 1947, then
an action should be commenced and prosecuted and the
parties should share equally in the costs· and recovery had
for being deprived of the use and possession of the land for
1948 and all subsequent years.
Under date of August 20, 1947, application to appropriate 5 second feet of water was filed with the State Engineer of Utah·. :On Oct. 23, 1947, publication of notice of
application to appropriate water was begun and on Nov.
20, 1947, the publication was completed. The application
was approved on Feb. 27, 1948. Proof of appropriation was
by the application to be subJ?itted to the State Engineer on
Jan. 5, 1950. On March 24, 1950, amendment for -change
in Point of Diversion was approved. Proof of application
of water was not submitted at the fixed time, but on Jan.
7, 1950, the application was reinstated and the tim~ for
making proof of beneficial use of the water applied for was
extended to Jan. 5, 1952. (See plaintiffs' Exhibit G). On
Dec. 6, 1948, the plaintiffs conveyed the land in question to
David S. Powelson and Arnold Dewitt Trotter. (See plaintiffs' Exhibit C.)
David S. Powelson, a witness called by the plaintiffs
over objection of the defendants, testified in part: That the
land was planted to erops in the Spring of 1950; that about
25 acres was planted to potatoes and the remainder to
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grain (Tr. 36). That about 75 or 80 acres were planted to
dry grain and a!bout 30 acres to irrigated wheat; that the
dry grain went about 15 bushel to the acre and the irrigated
about 40 bushels (Tr. 37). That in 1946 or 1947 he went
over the land with a Mr. Marcellus Palmer, a land specialist (Tr. 38); that they made borings on the land and examined the soil (Tr. 39); that the reasonable rental value of
the land that was irrigated was, in his opinion, $30.00 per
acre and the land that was not irrigated $10.00 per acre
(Tr. 42-43). On cross-examination, Mr. Powelson testified
in part: That he did not know of any dry land in Goshen
Valley that rented for $10.00 an acre (Tr. 92); that he rented land under the Elberta Irrigation System for $30.00 per
acre (Tr. 93). Mr. Powelson was asked these questions and
gave these answers:
"Well, it was a matter of speculation into the future how much this land would produce if irrigated or if
used as dry land, isn't that correct?"
A. ''Well, you can only judge by the results; in the
1950 crops is all.''
Q. ''Well, you couldn't tell in advance what this land
would produce?''
A. "The only thing I could tell was that it was some
of the best soil in the valley, and that is a natural consequence of getting good production of crops."
Q. "Well, it depended upon water supply, didn't it?"
A. "Oh yes."
. Q.- "And. it· didn't depend upon the weather?"
A. "Oh yes, it would depend upon the weather."
Q. "And also the rain fall and snow fall, is that correct?"
.Q.
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A.

"That's right. The dry farm."
Q. "And the sunshine."
A. "The dry farm, yes."
Q. "And also pests, didn't it?"
A. "It depends upon a lot of things, yes."

(Tr. 101).

There \Vas also received in evidence an assignment,
Exhibit I, by which Mr. David S. Powelson purports to assign to Hyrum Jenkins and Belle Moyle Jenkins all of his
claim for damages caused by withholding the land here involved from his possession during the pendency of the appeal. The assignment recites that .Mr. Powelson received
$10.00 for the assignment, but he testified that he did not
receive anything for the assignment, but that he paid $10.00
to Mr. Jenkins' attorney for the assignment (Tr. 104). Later Mr. Po\velson increased the amount to $50.00 or $60.00
that he gave to be relieved from all liability in connection
with the assignment and the contract (Tr. 105 and 179) .
Mr. Powelson further testified that he absolutely will not
get anything out of this lawsuit even if Mr. Jenkins prevails
in getting judgment (Tr. 180) . Mr. Powelson also testified
that the land in question had a rental value of between 10
and 15c per acre per annum as grazing land {Tr. 41), and
also that he developed about 1V2 second feet of water when
he drilled the well (Tr. 177) ; that it cost him about $4,000.00
to get the water for the 160 acres (Tr. 103).
There is considera:ble evidence in the records as to the
rental value of the land similar to that here involved, especially for use as grazing land. (See testimony of Merrill
L. Oldroyd, who paid either $26.00 or $28.00 per annum
for 560 acres (Tr. 50) and $20.00 for another tract of land
consisting of 320 acres.) Albert Morgan placed the annual
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rental value at 15c per acre (Tr. 121) ; that he saw the land
operated by Powelson while it was planted to grain and potatoes; that in 1951 barley was planted on the land but it
was not all harvested (Tr. 132) ; that he saw the crop that
was grown on the land in .1950 and in his opinion the wheat
produced was less than 9 bushels per acre (Tr. 129); that
he went $9.00 in the hole one year when he planted dry
wheat (Tr. 124); that the potatoes raised were very small
and about 2/3 of the crop was left on the ground (Tr. 130);
that it looked like the crop was burning up between irrigations (Tr. 131) ; part of the crop planted on the land in 1951
was not harvested (Tr. 132).
Rex White, a witness called by defendant, testified: That
he owns land which is two rods north and 240 rods west of
the land involved in this litigation, whieh land is comparable
to the land here involved. That in the fall of 1947 he plowed
35 acres of his land a~d planted it to barley which came up
that fall and the following spring, but he couldn't have cut
half a peck (Tr. 139). That in 1950 he planted his land
to wheat; that it came up in the fall and next spring and
looked like he would have·a bumper -crop, but it burned up
during the summer and he could not have harvested half
·a pound (Tr. 140); that he has leased his 35 acres for $10.00;
that the rainfall on his land is about 9.38 inches; that the
soil has been tested to a depth of 14 inches; that the rainfall on Powelson's property would be about the same as it
is on his land (Tr. 145).
Mr. Trotter, a witness called by the plaintiff, testified
that he went onto the ground here involved for the purpose
of breaking it up in June, 1949 (Tr. 154). Mr. Trotter, over
objection of counsel for the defendants, further testified
that in 1950 they got 1200 bushels from the dry land con-
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sisting of 80 acres, and 1885 bushels from the 27 acres that
was irrigated, and they had 20 acres planted to potatoes
· : (Tr. 155); that he is a grantee in the Deed from Jenkins,
but he didn't pay anything for the land, but that he claims
an undivided one-half interest in the land with Mr. Powelson (Tr. 158).
Edgar Finch testified that land such as that here would
rent at about 10c an acre and might rent for as high as a
quarter an acre. That he does not know of any dry farming in the vicinity of Goshen (Tr. 182). Milton Buxton, a
\vitness called by the defendants, testified th~t he has rented land similar to the land here involved for 3c per acre
(Tr. 182) and another tract for 4c per acre (Tr. 193). That
land in that vicinity sells for about $15.00 per acre (Tr. 1956). That he does not know of any dry land in Goshen Valley having been rented for dry land farming (Tr. 196).
Ned Okelberry, a witness called by defendants, testified that he bought 240 acres of land in the vi·cinity of the
Jenkins property in 1944 or 1945 for $2.50 per acre (Tr.
199-200). That he rented land near the Jenkins land in
1947-1948 from the Tintic Standard Mining from 5 to 15c
per acre; that this land is better for grazing than the J enIdns land; that he does not know of any land having been
rented in Goshen V1alley for dry farming (Tr. 201).
Milo Burriston testified that the Jenkins land was fit
for grazing and as such has an annual rental value of 15e
per acre; that he did not know of any land in Goshen Valley that had been successfully used for dry land crops (Tr.
204).

Willis Morgan, one of the defendants, testified in his
o"vn behalf: That the Jenkins property was fenced in 1949
(Tr. 207); that no crops were grown on the land in 1949;
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that crops were planted on the land in 1950 (Tr. 208); that
some potatoes were planted but 2/3 of the crop was left on
the ground (Tr. 209); that in 1951 the land was planted to
barley but part of the crop was not harvested; that he rented 640 acres of land just North and West of the Jenkins
land by paying the taxes (Tr. ·211-212) ; that the land is
good spring pasture for cattle and better than the Jenkins
land; that he had a conversation with Mr. Jenkins in 1947
in which he said that he was not interested in his land and
would not spend a dime on it (Tr. 213); That the total tax
on the property here involved was $6.52 in 1948, $6.21 in
1949, and $6.14 in 1950 (Tr. 215).
Bert Morgan testified that the reasonable rental value
of the land here involved in 1947 and 1948 was not to exceed 15 cents per acre per annum (Tr. 221); that he rents
500 acres for $25.00 for grazing (Tr. 222).
John B. Morgan, one of the defendants, testified in his
own behalf, that he rented the land described as Defendants' Exhibit 2, consisting of 247 acres for $36.00 per year;
that the land so rented is a little less than one-half mile
north of the Jenkins property (Tr. 229); that the Jenkins
property cannot be used for grazing more than 2 or 3 weeks
because that is as long as the feed lasts; that the 247 acres
which he leases for $36.00 per year is much better than the
Jenkins property for grazing (Tr. 230); that he owns land
all around that of Jenkins; that his ground has sagebrush
growing on it the same as the Jenkins land; that the rental
value per acre per year is not to exceed 15c (Tr. 232); that
he is paying $200.00 per year for 43 acres of irrigated land
which is situated 2Y2 miles North of the Jenkins land (Tr.
233).
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We have directed the attention of the Court to the foregoing evidence which is not in any sense a complete ·transcript, but as this is an action at· law, the eVidence so referred- to, as we view it, is more than ample to support the;
judgment rendered by the trial court.
ARGUMENT

We shall discuss the two points which ·plaintiffs desig~:
nate in their brief· a·s the basis of their claim that the judg.:
merit appealed from should be reversed in the order in which·
the same are mentioned in appellants' brief. It is, of
elementary that this,- being an action at law, the· findings'
of the trial court must be sustained if there is substantial.
evidence to sustain the same. Such is the mandate of Article 8, Section 9 of our State Constitution, where· it pr~
vides that the appeal (from-District· Courts) shall--"in
case at law- be on questions of law alone." Such is also our'
statutory law and the repeated 'cind'uniform holding of 'this
Court. U. C~ A. 1943, 104..:41-1 and cases cited iri foot notes
thereto in VoL 6, page -392,- note 49. ·

course,

ANSWER TO POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COP~T DID N()T ERR I~ CONCLLJP~·
ING TIIAT.THE BASIS FOR DETERMINING THiE DAM-·
AGES SHOULD ~E THE RENTAL VALUE OF THE
LfWI). AS GRAZING AND NOT ~AS AGRICULTURAL.
LAND.
The evidence shows without conflict these facts:
The appeal bond upon which this action is prosecuted
was executed on September 2,.1947 (See Exhibit A, which
is attached to plaintiffs' Complaint R. 5-8).. The Remittitur
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affirming the cause was filed in the District Court on Sept.
9, 1948. It is so alleged in plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 4).
And so found by the trial court (R. 14) . '"fh us the plaintiffs
were deprived of the possession of the land for one year and
one week. It was not until Feb. 27, 1948, that the application to appropriate water on the land was approved (See
Plaintiffs' Exhibit G). Thus neither the plaintiffs nor Mr.
Powelson could lawfully have drilled a well until after Feb.
27, 1948. Moreover, notwithstanding the plaintiffs or Mr.
Powelson could have taken possession of the land on or after
September 9, 1948, nothing was done by way of drilling a
well for water until along in 1949 and did not start breaking up the land until August, 1949 (Tr. 97). The first crop
was planted in 1950 (Tr. 98). The plaintiffs parted with
their title on December 6, 1948.
It is thus obvious that the land here in question was
not and could not have been used as irrigated land during
the time it was owned by the plaintiffs. No claim is made
or could reasonably be made that water could have· been
made available for irrigation for the growing seaso~ of
1948. That being so, there is no basis for the claim that
plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages on the claim that
their land should be considered as irrigated ,agricultural
lands during the time that they were the owners thereof.
The difficulty with the claim for damages on the basis
that the land in question should be regarded as agricultural
lands lies deeper than the fact that no water could lawfully
be made available for the irrigation of such lands for the
growing season of 1948.
While Mr. Powelson, a witness for plaintiffs, testified
that the reasonable rental value of the Jenkins land as dry
land was $10.00 per acre and as irrigated land $30.00 per
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acre, other witnesses testified to the contrary, and the surrounding facts belie any such claimed rPntal value as that
testified to by Po\ve lson.
1~he testhnony in th~ case, son1e of which \Ve have· heretofore directed to the attention of the Court, shows that
there is a large amount of land similar to and in the immediate vicinity of the Jenkins property and including the
Jenkins property that has never been devoted to the raising
of either dry land or irrigated agricutural crops. Throughout the years such of this land as has been leased brought
a rental of up to 15c an acre per annum for use as grazing
lands. The Jenkins land was of so little value for any purpose that so far as appears, it had never been rented and
Mr. Jenkins stated that he would not spend a dime to retain it. If the land had any such rental value as that now
claimed by the appellants, it is, to say the least, extremely
unlikely that the owners thereof would not have rented it
for some such fabulous price as $10.00 to $30.00 per acre,
during the time they or their predecessors were the owners
thereof. So also if these lands had any such a rental value,
it is, to say the least, extremely rmlikely that Mr. Jenkins
would be willing to sell the same for Y2 of income derived
therefrom for the year 1948 plus $500.00 if a flow of two
second feet of water was obtained by the drilling of a well.
That is all that plaintiffs were to receive for the property
Wlder the provisions of the agreement, Plaintiffs' Exhibit
B, and if possession- could not be obtained by September 1,
1947, and a suit was necessary to recover possession, the
plaintiffs were, by the contract, obligated to pay one-half
of the court costs and were entitled to only one-half of the
amount of the recovery. People with property of a rental
value of from $1600.00 to $4800.00 a year do not sell their
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property for any such pittahce as that provided in the agreement, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B. Nor is it likely that one owning
property with a rental value of from $1600.00 to $4800.00
a year can get off with the payment of an annual general
tax of less than $7.00.
So also if the witness David· S. Powelson actually be·
lieved that he and plaintiff, Hyrum Jenkins, were entitled
to share and share alike damages as provided in Plaintiffs' .
Exhibit B on the basis of the land having a rental value :in
the amount testified to by him, it would indeed seem strange
that he would· be willing to pay the sum of $50.00 or $60.00
to get Jenkins to accept the assignment, Exhibit I, and-relieve him from further liability, yet that is the effect. of his
testimony (Tr. 104-105).
Moreover, the testimony of Mr. Powelson to the effect·
that the Jap was willing to pay $10.00 for that part of the
Jenkins land- that was not supplied with water and $30.00
for that which was ·supplied with water is so improbable:
that the Court might well ·have disbelieved the same.· It
is apparent that the Jap could have rented land without
wat~r· apparently as good as the Jenkins land for a few
cents-per acre. There was no lahd,in the immediate neighborhood of the -Jenkins land that had been demonstrated
to be profitable for raising dry la:nd grain. On the contrary,
Albert 'Morgan had gone $27.00 behind in the ope'ration of
40 acres of. dry land in the immediate vicinity of the Jenkins property, (Tr. 124).- So far as appears, the conversation had with the Jap, testified to by Mr. ·Powelson, may.
have been just loose talk. In any event, the· Jap did not,
so far aS' is· made to appear, ex·amine the-land, and the witness .p:owelsori· conveniently had the ·Jap iri ,California at
the, time of the triat
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Still another fatal weakness to plaintiffs' claim of a
right to damages on the basis that the land here involved
was fit for raising agricultural crops is the fact that it would
be a matter of pure speculation as to whether or not such
use would be profitable. Plaintiffs' principal witness, David
S. Powelson, so testified (Tr. 100-101).
During the trial, counsel for the plaintiffs stated that
the present action was to recover the value of the use of
the property as agricultural ground and not for profits
that might be derived from its operation (Tr. 111). However, considerable evidence was received over objection of
counsel for the defendants which was directed to the question of profits, and some of the cases cited by counsel for
plaintiffs in their brief are directed to the question of profits. Indeed some of the language quoted, such as that
from the case of Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., et al, 241 Pac.
(2d) 1914, quoted on page 11 of appellants' brief, would
seem to indicate that plaintiffs claim the right to recover
damages without regard to whether such damages are <?n
the theory of rental value or prospective profits and also
without regard to how uncertain, contingent or speculative
such damages might be. However, in the case of Moorhead
v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 165 N. W. 484, L. R. A. 1918 C 391,
cited and quoted from on page 11 of appellants' brief, it
will be seen that damages tha_t may properly be awarded
must be "free of uncertain, contingent, conjectural or speculative elements." The authorities generally teach that "a
party to a contract who is injured by another's breach of
the contract, is entitled to recover from the latter damages
for all injuries and only such injuries as are the direct, natural and proximate result of the breach, or which in the
ordinary course of events would likely result from a breach
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and can reasonably be said to have been foreseen, contemplated, or expected by the parties at the time when they
made the contract as a probable or natural result of a
breach, including gains prevented as well as losses sustained." 15 Am. Jur. Sec. 51, page 449-450, and cases cited
in the foot notes.
Another rule applied by the courts as to the measure
of damages is thus expressed in 15 Am. Jur. Sec. 55, page
459:
"In general, it may be said that in measuring the
damages for the breach of a contract, a supposedly successful collateral operation that a party might have
made if he had not been prevented from realizing the
proceeds of the contract at the time stipulated cannot
be taken into consideration. This is the rule not only
because of the uncertain and contingent issue of such
an operation in itself, but because it has no legal or
necessary connection with the stipulations between the
parties, and cannot therefore be presumed to have entered into their consideration at the time of contracting. It has accordingly been held that the loss of any
speculation or enterprise in which a party may have
embarked, relying on the proceeds to be derived from
the fulfillment of an existing contract, constitutes no
part of the damages to be recovered in case of breach,
and no recovery can be had for losses resulting from
inability. to make or carry out a collateral contract,
such as the loss of anticipated profits, or for expenses
incurred in preparation f.or its performance, where the
party breaking the original contract had not notice of
the existing or contemplated collateral agreement.''
~s

to the recovery of profits the law is thus stated in
15 Am. J ur. ·Sec. 152, page 564:
'To warrant a recovery fior loss of profits in an
action for breach of a contract, it must be made to ap4
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, pear that such loss of profits was the natural and proximate, not the remote, result or consequence of the
breach of the contract and such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been within the contemplation of the
parties when the contract was made as the probable
result of its breach. It is further necessary that it be
reasonably certain that profits would have been realized except for the breach of the contract. When prospective profits are remote, conjectural and speculative,
thy cannot be said to be the direct and unavoidable result of the breach and cannot be recovered."
Numerous cases are cited in the foot notes to the text,
which support the same.
Applying the doctrine announced in the foregoing text
and the cases cited in the foot notes, there would seem to
be no escape from the conclusion that it was at best a matter of speculation as to whether any profits would or could
be realized from devoting the land here involved for raising
cultivated crops. No success had theretofore been made
on any lands in that immediate vicinity and there had been
some failures, notably that of Albert Morgan on land adjacent to the Jenkins land (Tr. 124) .
We have probably needlessly digressed somewhat from
the theory upon which this case was tried and decided. As
heretofore pointed out, ·counsel for the plaintiffs stated at
the trial that plaintiffs sought to recover the reasonable
rental value of the property and not any profits that might
have been realized.
That the sole basis of the recovery by the plaintiffs is
the reasonable rental value of the land is further borne out
by the bond which provides that if the judgment is affirmed
the sureties will be liable for the payment of damages "occasioned by waste and the value of the use and occupancy of
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the property from the time of the appeal until the delivery
of possession thereof to said plaintiff." The provisions of
the supersedeas bond just quoted is in conformity with RUle
73d of Utah Rules of Civil Precedure.
In light of the fact that the land involved in this litigation was not fenced, was in its native state, covered wirth
sagebrush, native grasses and weeds; that such land as had
been devoted to raising of dry wheat in the immediate vicinity of these lands had proven a failure; that no permit had
been granted, or was granted until the year 1948 by the
State Engineer to drill a vvell for water, and the fact that
before the land could be broken up and planted to crops
and water secured to irrigate the same it was necessary to
spend several thousand dollars and even then the venture
might well prove a failure, it is, to say the least, extremely
improbable that anyone would pay a rental of more than
that awarded by the trial court for the use of the land during the one year and one week that elapsed between t~e
time the supersedeas bond was executed and the time the
plaintiffs were restored to the possession of the land. Certain it is that David S. Powelson was not willing, or if he
was he did not undertake to pay the plaintiffs any such rental'as that to which he testified was· the reasonable rental
thereof.
Further as to that, even though this Court should not
agree with the findings of the trial court, ,sucll fact does
not authorize this Court to reverse the findings of the trial
court in this, an action at ·law. In this connection, it may
be noted that the finder of the facts is not boillld to believe
. opinion or evidence as to the rental value of a tract of land
·even if such evidence is uncontradicted.
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We have read the cases and authorities cited by appellants. So far as we can find, none of them announce any
other or different doctrine than is announced in the general
principles of law stated by the authorities which we have
heretofore quoted. That being so, no useful purpose will
be served by a detailed discussion of such cases. At the
bottom of page 17 of appellants' brief, the statement is made
that plaintiffs should be awarded a judgment for damages
for a period of t\vo years. It is said that it was physically
impossible to break the ground until September 9, 1948,
at which time it was impossible rto break the ground for the
1949 crop.

If it was impossible to break the ground for

the 1949 crop after September 9, 1948, it necessarily fol-.
lows that it was impossible to break the ground after September 2, 1947, for the 1948 crape It will be seen that the
plaintiffs were deprived of the use of the land only one week
more than one year.
There is a total absence of any evidence that the rental value of the property in question for one week is equivalent to its rental value for a whole year or that· plaintiffs
sustained damage for a whole year because defendants had
possession of the land for a week beyond the year.
An attempt was made to show that a man was available to break up the land in September of 1947, but was

not available in Septernber of 1~48. Obviously, the availability or lack of availability, even if contrary to defendants' evidence, if true, such fact is not a proper element to
consider in awarding damages.
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ANSWER TO POINT ll

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN STRIKING THE
TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIF·FS AND THEIR WTNESSES
TOUCHING THE QUESTION OF WHAT HAS BEEN
DONE WITH THIS PROPERTY SINCE THE DEED WAS
MADE FROM JENKINS TO POWELSON AND TROTTER ON DECEMBER 6, 1948, OR IN STRIKING ALL
OF THE TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO AN 0'RAL CONTRACT OR CONVERSATION BETWEEN BOWELSON
AND THE JAP, WillCH WAS RECEIVED AS BEARING
ON THE RENTAL VALUE OR VALUE OF THE USE OF
THE PRDPERTY (Tr. 262).

Beginning on page 18 of appellants' brief, complaint i~
made because the court struck some evidence which plaintiffs claim to be pertinent to determine the use of the property involved in this action. While the appellants fail to
point out with particularity the evidence which they claim
was improperly stricken, we assume it was the testimony
above referred to. There seems to be no other testimony
· stricken that could be meant.
We have no quarrel with the statement of counsel for
plaintiffs to the effect that one who is deprived of the use
of his property is entitled to damages on the basis of the
reasonable rental value of his property when used for the
most profitable use for which the property is adapted. We, .
however, are unable to see how that fact supports plaintiffs' claim that the Court should consider facts that occurred after plaintiffs had been put into possession. of their
property and after they had parted with their title to the
property. So far as appears, there was no one in the Goshen Valley or interested in renting land therein who was
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possessed of the attainments of a clairvoyant. As we have
heretofore pointed out in this brief, plaintiffs are, according to their pleading and the statement of their counsel,
seeking to recover the reasonable rental value of their land
during the time they were deprived of the use thereof. That
is to say, such rental as a person who is willing but not required to rent will pay in a transaction or lease agreement
with one who is willing but not.required to let the land.
Obviously persons without the faculty of foresee~g into the future could not be influenced in making a contract
for the lease of a tract of land far in excess of the going
····price. Certain it is that the plaintiffs were not possessed
with such attairl..ments, or they would not have sold for a
mere pittance a tract of land which, according to the statement of.their attorney on page 21 of their brief, had an annual rental value of $2810.00. Nor did the court below err
in striking the testimony of the witness David S. Powelson
as to the alleged conversation of the Jap as to what the
Jap would pay for the rental of the Jenkins property. City
of St. Louis v. Gerhart Realty_ Co., 40 S. W. (2d) 661; 328
Mo. 103; Consolidated Gas Service Co. v. Tyler, 63 Pac.
(2d) 88; 178 Old. 325. U. S. v. Meyer C. C. A., 111, 113 F.
(2d) 387. Sharp v. U. S. 191 U. S. 341; 24 S. Ct. 114. This
Court in the case of Ogden L. and I R. Co. v. Jones, 51 Utah
62; 168 Pac. 548, at page 551 of the Pacific Reporter says
that it is improper for a land owner in a condemnation proceeding to testify to an offer made for the land sought to
be condemned.
For the court below to have given any weight to the
testimony of the witness Powelson as to the offer claimed
to have been made by the Jap, would have been whoUy unjustified. At the tin1e of the trial, the Jap was in California
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and not· available as a witness. If he had been questioned
about the alleged conversation, we, of course, do not know
what his testimony would have been. However, it is certain that he would not pay any such rental as that testified ·
to by Mr. Powelson until the land was cleared of brush, nor
is it claimed that he would have paid a rental of $30.00 an
acre for land until water was available. As is said by some
of the cases above cited, it would open wide the door to
fraud to admit evidence of an offer to buy or lease land,
and in our investigation we have found no case that has
approved the admission of such evidence.
We submit the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs to respondents. .
RespeCtfully submitted,
J. RULON MORGAN
ELIAS HANSEN

Attorneys for Respondents
./
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